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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OFI UTAH 
JESSE B. Srl1 t ):\1~~, l 
P l a i 11 f iff a n d A p p e l1 ant, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE CITY, a 1nunicipal corpora-
tion, J. BRA·CKEN LEE, JOEL. CHRIS-
TE~\SEN", L. C. RO~INEY, T. I. GEliRTS 
and J. K. Pil~~RCY, its Commissioners, , 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, and GUS P. BACI(~IAN, 
its Seeretar~T' ZIONS SE·CURITIES COR-
PORATION, a corporation, and THE 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENrr 
OF THE CHURCI-I OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a corpora-
tion, sole, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
LYXN FAUSErrT AND FIAMETTA 
F.A_1TRI£TT, 
Plaintiffs in Intr:rrention and Appellants. 
Case No. 
D2GS 
BRIEF OF RESPO·NDENT 
Zions Securities Co~rporation 
PRELin1IN ARY STATE~IENT 
The Defendant ZIO~S SEClTRITIES CORPORA-
TION '"Till hereinafter be referred to as "ZIOXS SE-
ClTRITIES," and the Defendant CORPORATIOX OF 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHURC~H OF JESl~S 
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CliRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAl~rrs \\'ill hereinafter 
he referred to as "CORPORATIO~ O:F~ THE PRESI-
DEl~T." The Plaintiff and Appellant JESSE B. STON~ 
\vill hereinafter be referred to as "P L1\INTI~-,F'' and 
the Plaintiffs in Intervention ,, .. ill hereinafter be referred 
to as "FAUSETT." 
STATE1IEXT OF F..:\C1~8 
This Defendant Zions Securities, desires to restate 
certain of the facts for clarification. It is a n1atter of 
common knowledge that there have been considered vari-
ous sites in Salt Lake ·City for the construction of a ne'v 
Federal Building. One of the sites that ""'as considered by 
the Federal Government was that site kno\Yn as the La-
fayette School, located on North rremple bet,veen State 
and }fain Street. Another site that has been considered 
has been that of the Public Safety Building and Fire Hall 
on the Southeast corner of JTirst South and State Street 
and other sites had been considered, such as Fort Doug-
las and an area on Fourth South Street bet,veen ~lain 
and \Y .. est Temple. This ""'hole la\\.,suit ha~ its roots in the 
selection of the site for a proposed Federal Building. 
Originally the site considered for the Federal Build-
ing \v·as that of the Lafayette School. ~Ir. Burton ,, .... 
l\1 usser, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff and ..~..~p­
pellant herein, brought suit against Salt Lake City and 
certain of the Defendants to enjoin the sale of that prop-
erty. That suit is 8till pending. On February -t 1960, the 
(~hamber of Co1nmerce hy ~lr. Gus C. Backman, sub-
Initted a bid to Salt Lake c~ity for the purchase of the 
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property known as the Public Safety Building and Fire 
Station on the corner of First South and State Street in 
Salt Lake City. (Par. 13, Plaintiff's Co1nplaint). I3y 
the ter1ns of this bid, it was proposed that the property 
would be purchased for $750,000.00 and possession "ras 
to be given to the United States Government on or before 
January 1, 1961. It \Yas further proposed that this prop-
erty 1nay be used as the site of the construction of a ne\Y 
Federal Building. This bid was accepted by Salt I..~ake 
City for the sale of the property and shortly thereafter 
this suit was filed by Mr. Stone through his attorneys, 
including Mr. Musser, the attorney of the other case in-
volving the Lafayette School. 
Separate and apart from anything to do with the 
Federal Building is the sale of Forest Dale Golf Course. 
This sale was bet\veen Salt Lake City and the Corpora-
tion of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints. The contract of sale was on January 
14, 1959. ~Iore than one year before the negotiationH 
were undertaken for the sale of the Public Safety Build-
ing and Fire Station. 
In the lawsuit that \vas filed by the Plaintiffs herein, 
two causes of action \Vere alleged. The first relating to 
the sale of the property hereinafter referred to as the 
Public Safety property, and the second cause of action re.-
lating to the sale of Forest Dale Golf Course. In Plain-
tiff's First Cause of Action he seeks to declare null and 
void the bid of the Chamber of Commerce of Salt Lalie 
City and the acceptance by the Salt Lake City Colnmis-
sion, on the sale and transfer of the property known as 
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Public Safety Building and seeks to enjoin the transfer 
of this property. 
In Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action he seeks to 
declare null and void a contract for the sale of Forest 
Dale Golf Course bet\veen Salt Lake City Corporation 
and the Corporation of the President. It is interesting to 
note so far as this Defendant is concerned that no\rhere 
in Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action does the Plaintiff 
allege or claim anything about this Defendant. The en-
tire allegation as to Plaintiff's Second Cause of .. A_ttion 
relates to that contract between Salt Lake City and the 
Corporation of the President. Insofar as the allegations 
in Plaintiff's First Cause of Action about this Defendant, 
Plaintiff alleges as follows: 
1. This corporation was a corporation duly organ-
ized and existing under the la\YS of the State of Utah 
(Paragraph 4, Page 2 of Plaintiff's Complaint); 
2. All of the stock of this corporation is O\\Tned by 
the Corporation of the President ~. (except a fe"T shares 
placed in the name of its director~ to enable then1 to 
qualify as directors thereof)". (Paragraph 5, Page 2 
of Plaintiff's Complaint) ; 
3. This corporation is engaged in carrying out the 
financial business of the Corporation of the President 
(Paragraph 5, Page 2, Plaintiff's Co1nplaint) ~ 
4. This corporation already has an option to pur-
chase the Lafayette School for a Federal Building, 
(Paragraph 12, Page 3 of Plaintiff\~ Con1plaint) ~ 
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t>. The Plaintiff \\·hile he was a 1ne1nber of tl:t~ 
Chureh of Jesus ·Christ of Latter-day Saints contributed 
tithing and has an interest in a trust fund (Paragraph 
1, Page 1 of Plaintiff's Con1plaint); 
6. This Defendant in conjunction ''"'ith other De-
fendants will prevail upon the LTnited States to build a 
Federal Building at the site selected here, (Paragraph 
~0, Page 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint) ; 
7. The Trust Fund of the Corporation of the Presi-
dent and this Defendant can only be used for the men1-
bers of the Church for the benefit of religion, works of 
charity, and for public worship and not for the purchase 
of a site for a Federal Building, (Paragraph 20 (f) Page 
7 of Plaintiff's Con1plaint). 
Based upon these allegations insofar as Zions Secur]-
ties is concerned, Plaintiff claims that Zions Securities 
should be enjoined from purchasing the property and 
that the Court should declare that neither Zions Securi-
ties nor the Corporation of the President may purchase 
the site for the erection of the Federal Building nor use 
any of their assets to the pay1nent in the purchase price 
thereof, (Paragraph 5 of Prayer on Page 10, Plaintiff's 
Complaint). To this Complaint, Zions Securities filed 
a motion to dismiss and a motion to sever the causes 
of action. A motion to intervene "\vas filed on behalf of 
Lynn Fausett and Fiametta Fausett adopting the Corn-
plaint of the Plaintiff, but allegeing that these people 
were currently members of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints and have made contributions in tithing 
5 
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and otherwise to said church. All of these motion~ \vere 
heard before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson in open 
Court on the 31st day of March, 1960, and Memorandums 
\vere subinitted in support of the arguments of all par-
ties concerned. After due deliberation, Judge IIanson 
then entered a Decree dismissing the la\\Tsuit insofar as 
the First Cause of Action 'vas concerned against all of 
the Defendants and dismissing the lawsuit insofar as 
the Second Cause of Action against all Defendants except 
Salt Lake City. He held that because of this determina-
tion it was unnecessary to pass upon Fauset's Inotion to 
intervene. It is from this Order dismissing the causes of 
action that the Appellant has appealed. 
STATEMENT OF POIXTS 
Zions Securities feels that the sixteen points put 
forth in Plaintiff's Brief boil do\vn to two particular 
issues insofar as this Defendant is concerned and will 
ans\Yer the points of the Appellant by these t\\To issues. 
POINT I 
NEITHER PLAINTIFF NOR FAUSETT HAVE ANY 
STANDING IN COURT TO SUE ZIONS SECURI'TIES. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRE·CTLY DISMISSED THE 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND DENIED THE INTER-
VENTION OF FAUSETT BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS ON 
THEIR FACE SHOW THAT NEITHER THE PLAINTIFF 
NOR FAUSETT STATE ANY CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
ZIONS SECURITIES IN THE FOLLOWING P ARTI·CULARS: 
(a) !THERE IS NO ALLEGATION INVOLVING ZIONS 
SECURITIES IN THE SECOND GAUSE OF ACTION. 
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(b) IN THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AS A MATTER 
OF LAW NEITHER THE PLAINTIFF NOR FAUSETT HAS 
ANY CLAIM TO ANY TRUST FUND, NOR IS THERE ANY 
BREACH OF TRUST. 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I 
NEITHER PLAINTIFF NOR FAUSETT HAVE ANY 
STANDING IN COURT TO SUE ZIO:t-~S SECURI'TIES. 
Neither Plaintiff nor Fausett is a stockholder of 
Defendant Zions Securities, and therefore cannot bring 
an action for hin1self or other persons similarly situated 
against said ·Corporation. It is admitted by Plaintiff' . ..; 
Complaint that Plaintiff is not a stockholder of the De-
fend Zions Securities, (See Paragraph 5, Page 2 of Plain-
tiff's Complaint); yet Plaintiff's action appears to be 
in the nature of a stockholder's suit against the Corpora-
tion. That a person cannot bring a suit against a corpo-
ration of which he is not a stockholder for alleged \vrong-
ful conduct of the corporation or its officers in the man-
aging of corporate affairs is so basic a principle of la\v 
that it needs little citation of authority. Nor is Plaintiff 
or Fausett a stockholder of the Corporation of the Presi-
dent, which owns all of the stock of Zions Securities, ex-
cept for qualifying shares of directors. In discussing '"·ho 
has the right to sue in a "Stockholder's Suit,'' Fletcher 
Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol. 13, Sec. 5972 states: 
''Relief may be obtained, in a proper case, at 
the suit of a single stockholder, but the fact that 
no other minority stockholders come in as plain-
tiffs may properly be considered. 
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".A stockholder cannot :ille unless he is a stock-
holder in fact at the ti1ne the suit is brought. If 
he has not yet become a stockholder by reason of 
nonperformance of his contract of subscription 
or contract for the purchase of shares, or by rea-
son of the fact that his subscription is upon a con-
dition precedent which has not yet been performed 
by the corporation, or if he has ceased to be a 
stockholder by reason of a transfer or forfeiture 
of his shares, he has no standing to complain. A 
citizen is not a stockholder "Tho may join as plain-
tiff in a suit affecting a corporation in which the 
public owns stock. Necessarily there must have 
been an issue of stock and the acquisition of a 
right thereto. A 'contract holder' in a tontine 
diamond selling corporation cannot be regarded 
as a stockholder by reason of the fact that no 
certificates of stock other than such contracts 
have been issued." (Emphasis added.) 
It now appears from the Appellant's Brief that he 
concedes that the Plaintiff has no standing to complain 
about the use of the funds by Zions Securities or the 
Corporation of the President. 
"It will be observed that in the Con1plaint 
plaintiff does not claim that he is presently a 
member of the L.D.S. Church. That being so it 
1nay be doubted if he 1nay be heard to conzplain of 
the 1nanner in u·hich the trust fund held b,ll de-
fen.da.nts corporation of the President and Zions 
Sec11rit·ies are being expended notwithstanding 
plaintiff 1chile a nze1nber of such Church paid his 
tithing and n1ade other contr£lnd£ons to the L.D.S. 
Church." (Emphasis added) (Pag-e -!5 of ~\ppel­
lant's Brief) 
If there is any doubt in the Court's n1ind about the 
fact thnt a person "Tho has been a n1ember of a religious 
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organization and "·ithdra\Y~l therefro1n or has been <~x­
pelled or exconnnunicated therefrom ha~ no interest in 
the ehurch propert~T and cannot represent 1ne1nbers of 
the rhurch in an action to prevent an alleged diversion 
of church property fro1n its lawful uses. The follo\\Ting 
are cited in support of this doctrine: 
45 -l1nz. Jur., p. 7 43, "Religious Societies," Par. 18 
reads: 
'~It has been held that an expelled Inenlh~·r hn~ 
no interest in the church propPrty and that ex-
communicated members whose names have by the 
valid action of the church been expunged fro1n 
its membership roll cannot stand for and repre-
sent members of the church in an action to pre-
vent the diversion of church property from its 
lawful uses ... " 
See also Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 18 S.W. 
87-!, 15 L.R.A. 801. The above was quoted with approval 
in Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S.E. (2d) 368, and 
the court continued: 
"Where, as in this case, the validity of the 
expulsion of the plaintiffs as members of the 
church - grow out of a controversy relating to 
the faith, teaching, doctrine, and discipline of the 
church, and judgment of the church with a congre-
gational form of government with respect thereto 
is conclusive upon the civil courts, whether, in the 
opinion of the judges of such courts the decision 
appears to be right or wrong, for courts of equity 
"'"ill not interfere with the internal affairs of 
a religious organization involving questions of 
faith, practice, doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical 
law, rule, custom, or church government." 
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In Canovaro v. Brothers of Order of Her;nits, etc. 
( Pa.) 191 A. 140, the court said: 
"If persons who claim to exercise the right of 
control and disposition are not members, either 
because of excomrnunication or otherwise (Mer-
man v. St. 1fary's G. C. Church, 317 Pa. 33, 176 
A. 450) or have changed their n1embership to a 
church in another parish, or a change or parish 
lines has caused them to beco1ne members of an-
other church (St. Casemir's Polish R. ·C. Church's 
case, supra), they do not retain any right, nor 
do they have any voice, in the control or disposi-
tion of the property of the church of which they 
were once members. Dismemberment of the parish 
of our Lady of Good Counsel \Yorked this result 
... their right and obligations as members are 
governed by the la\\Ts of that denomination. Since 
the voluntary act of joining the church subjects 
them to its rules and regulations. The Roman 
Catholic canons and the decisions of the appro-
priate tribunals and officials of the church are de-
cisive of the issues here raised, unless in contra-
vention of the la\v of the land. The order of dis-
memberment \\~as binding on the parish n1en1ber~. 
Division, disn1ember1nent, or suppres~ion or par-
ishes, and the effect thereof on Inembership are 
purely ecclesiastical 1natters, dependent upon the 
church la\\T as adn1inistered by the appropriate 
authorities and tribunals. See St. Case1ner's 
Polish R. C. Church's Case, supra. 273 Pa. 494 at 
Page 501, 117 A. 219. The effect of the disinem-
berment of the parish and the transfer of appel-
lant's membership therefron1 to other parishes 
was to deprive them of all rights as members in 
the church property· of the parish from which they 
were transferred. ·Church men1ber8hip is an eccle-
siastical matter, not temporal. There ts no prop-
erty right in 1ncmbership, and there co·uld be no 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
]Jroperty right i,n ;nc})tbership, and there could be 
Ho ]Jroperty ri.r;hts 'in lay Htembers except through 
their JHenlucrship in tlze con[Jregation.·· (Empha-
sis added) 
Sec~ also, lV c!son v. JI onitor Congregational Clrurch, 
et al., 7-I~ Or. 1G2, 1-1:5 P. 3~i, 'vhere the court said: 
'"The plaintiff is not sho,,·n to be a member of 
either of the church organizations mentioned and 
hence not in a p·osition to question the act of any 
of these societies in the matter of conveying its 
property. We find in 34 Cyc. 1172, note 88, the 
following: 
'A nonmember of the church or society cannot 
;naintain an act~on to regulate the ttlse of the 
ch1trch property, even though he was one of the 
orig~nal grantors or was formerly a member of 
the society.' " (Emphasis added) 
The san1e principle of la\v "\Vould apply if a group 
or the entire congregation "\vithdra\YS. 
In Iiolt v. Trone, 341 Mich. 169, 67 N.vV. (2d) 125 
where Plaintiffs \vere removed as elders of the church, 
the court said : 
"In the case at bar plaintiffs were removed 
as elders of the church by vote of the membership 
of the church. 
'"The court finds that the plaintiffs \Vere not 
elders of the Joseph Campau Church of Christ at 
the time of filing this bill of complaint and had 
no rights in or to the church propert~~, either as 
officers of said church or in their individual capa-
city; that the right to th~~ use and control of the 
church propert:~ is vested in the church body oT 
congregation acting through its trustees." 
11 
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In Presbytery of Bismarck v. Allen, 7 4 ~.D. -100, 2:~ 
N.W. ( :2d) 625 the court quotes from the leading ease of 
Watsnn v. Jones, 13 Wall (1TS) 679, 20 L. Ed. 666: 
"It is obvious that the case at bar falls in 
the third class. The First Pre:-; byterian Church 
of Leith organized as a Presbyterian church. For 
more than twenty-five years it continued as an in-
tegral part of a larger church body; it recognized 
the authority and control of the so-called higher 
judicatory; it incorporated to promote religious 
worship according to the usages of the Presby-
terian Church, which at the tin1e "\Yas called the 
Presbyterian Church in the lTnited State:-; of 
America; its trustees were bound by the general 
laws, rules, and customs of said Presbyterian 
Church. 
"'In Watson v. Jones, supra, the court con-
cludes its opinion in the following words: 'But we 
need pursue this subject no further. \Vhatever 
1nay have been the case before the Kentucky court, 
the appellants in the case presented to us have 
separated themselves wholly fro1n the church 
organization to 'vhich they belonged "\Yhen this 
controversy commenced. r~[1hey no"T deny its au-
thority, denounce its action, and refuse to abide 
by its judgments. They have fir~t erected thein-
selves into a new organization, and have since 
joined themselves to another totally different, if 
not hostile, to the one which they belonged "Then 
the difficulty first began. [] nder any of the de-
cisions which we have exarnined_, the appellants, 
in their present position, have no right to the 
property, or to the use of its u~hich is the subject 
of this suit.'" (Emphasis added) 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SPP 11 rustees of J>ellcador J>resbyteriun Church c. 
Gibsoll, ~() DPL Ch. :~7;), ~:2 A (~d) 782 'vherein the court 
said: 
"The congregation Inay secede, but they can-
not take 'vith them the church property even if 
their action is unanimous. Trustees of Presbytery 
v. Trustees of Presbyterian Church of Weeha""kin, 
8 N.J.L. 57:2, 78 A. 207. And this is for the reason, 
as 'vill hereafter be shown, that the church prop-
erty does not belong to the congregation." 
Even if the assun1ption is Inade for the purpose of 
argument only that there is a fund held by Zions Securi-
ties ":hich is a trust fund of the Church bf Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints no relief should be granted the 
Plaintiff or Fausett because neither has any standing 
to sue. 
If the alleged trust were a private trust ('vhich it is 
not) there would be no doubt that the Plaintiff or Faus-
ett, if a beneficiar~,. could maintain a suit in his behalf to 
enforce the trust. In the present case, however, it is al-
leged by the Plaintiff and Fausett that it is a charitable 
trust, (Paragraph 7, Page 2 of Complaint), and in a char-
itable trust the beneficiary is the community itself. Scott 
on Trusts, Second Edition, 1956, p. 2614. A private in-
dividual cannot maintain a suit to enforce the charitable 
trust. Dickey v. W olker, 321 ~{o. 2335, 11 S.W. 2d ~78, 
62 A.L.R. 858, 1928, cert. denied ~79 U.S. 839, 49 S. Ct. 
252, 73 L. Ed. 986, 1929. 
Scott on Trusts, Section 391, pages 2056-2058, hns 
the following to say about the enforcement of charitable 
trusts, to wit: 
13 
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"On the other hand, a person who has no 
interest in the performance of the trust, no inter-
est other than as a member of the community, 
cannot maintain a suit for the enforcement of the 
trust. He may, if he can, induce the Attorney Gen-
eral to bring a suit, and the Attorney General 
may, if he chooses, bring the suit, only if the com-
plaining person is willing to act as relator and 
assume responsibility for the payment of costs. 
But a third person who has no special interest 
cannot himself maintain the suit. If a third per-
son were permitted to sue as a matter of right 
it "\vould be possible to subject the charity to har-
assing litigation. Thus where a testator left his 
estate in trust to establish and maintain an art 
1nuseum in a city, a resident and taxpayer of the 
city cannot maintain a suit to enforce the trust. 
The mere fact that a person 1nay in the discretion 
of the trustee become a recipient of a benefit 
under the trust does not entitle him to maintain 
a suit for the enforcement of the trust. Thus in a 
case in Connecticut "\Vhere an estate was left in 
trust to 1naintain a home for needy female teach-
ers in a certain country, it ''Tas held that a suit 
to enforce the trust could not be maintained by a 
group of needy teachers. Chief Justice 'Vheeler 
however, dissented on the ground that the class 
of beneficiaries was small enough so that its mem-
bers had a sufficient interest to permit them to 
ntaintain a suit for the enforcement of the trust. 
\Vhere a trust is created to 1naintain a charitable 
institution, the managers and other agents or em-
ployees engaged in the conducting of the institu-
tion have not such an interest in the performance 
of the trust as to permit them to maintain a suit 
for its enforcement. 
"The question remains 'vhether the settlor or 
his heirs or personal representatives can main-
tain a suit for the enforce1nent of a charitable 
14 
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trust. As we hare seen, the settlor cannot revoke 
u r modify a charitable trttst created by him unless 
he has reserved a power to do so. After the tr-nst 
is once created, he has no beneficial interest in the 
tru,st property. ..A.ccordingly, it has been held in 
a n1tmber of cases that the settlor has no stand-
ing to maintain a suit for the enforcement of a 
cha·ritable trust. There are, however, cases in 
which the opposite result has been reached. But 
where the settlor has a special interest in the per-
formance of the trust he can maintain a suit to 
enforce it. Thus in a case in New York it was held 
that where an association of the alumni of an edu-
cational institution gave a fund to the institution 
for the establishment of a professorship, reserv-
ing power to nominate the professor, the associa-
tion could maintain a suit to enforce the trust.'' 
(Emphasis added) 
The Restaternent of Trusts, Section 391 (d) states: 
"d. Person having no special interest. A 
suit for the enforcement of a charitable trust can-
not be maintained by persons who have no special 
interest in the enforcement of the trust. The mere 
fact that as members of the public they benefit 
from the enforcement of the trust is not a suffi-
cient ground to entitle them to sue, since a suit 
on their behalf can be maintained by the Attorney 
General." 
To the same effect see 10 Am. Jur., ucharities," Sec. 
116, 8670. 
In the present case, neither the Plaintiff nor Fausett 
IS the attorney general, nor is either a trustee of the 
trust, so neither has any standing to sue on either basis. 
The remaining question is whether or not the Plaintiff 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or Fausett has any special interest in the trust to entitle 
either to sue. It has been held that a special interest is 
something identifiable that separates the individual from 
the community - something that gives the individual 
rights outside his rights as a community member. For 
example it has been held that a trust for the salary of a 
minister of the church can be enforced by the minister 
(First Congregational Society in Raynham v. Trustees, 
23 Pick, 1 ±8, (~lass.) 1839) ; that a trust set up to endo\v 
a professional chair may be enforced by the professor 
occupying the chair (Scott on Trusts, Second Edition, 
1956, p. 2758.) ; that property given in trust to a chari-
table corporation may be enforced by the corporation 
(Iiarvard College v. Armory, 9 Pick 446. (:Jiass.) 1830); 
or where it is provided that preference shall be given to 
certain persons in the performance of a trust these per-
sons can maintain a suit to enforce the trust. (Darcy r. 
Kelley, 153 Mass. 433, 26 N .E. 1110, 1891). In the present 
case neither the Plaintiff nor Fausett possesses any 
quality to differentiate him from any other member of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints or of 
the com1nunity itself. He is literally one of a million, and 
to allo"'" him standing would be to strain the idea of spe-
cial interest to the point of ridirulousness. The Plain-
tiff's remedy lies in asking the Attorney General or the 
Corporation of the President or Zions Securities to bring 
suit. Any other re1nedy \Yould open up all charitable in-
stitutions to a multitude of ~uits by malcontents, and 
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POINT II. 
THE ·TRIAL COURT CORRE·CTLY DISMISSED THE 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND DENIED THE INTER-
VENTION OF FAUSETT BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS ON 
THEIR FACE SHOW THAT NEITHER THE PLAINTIFF 
NOR FAUSETT STATE ANY CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
ZIONS SECURITIES IN THE FOLLOWING PARTI·CULARS: 
(a) 'THERE IS NO ALLEGATION INVOLVING ZION"S 
SECURITIES IN THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
In Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action they allege 
that on January 1-!, 1959, Salt Lake City entered into a 
contract 'vith the Uorporation of the President whereby 
the city agreed to sell to the Corporation of the Presi-
dent the property known as Forest Dale. (Paragraph 
3, Page 10-11 of Plaintiff's Complaint.) The prayer for 
relief in the Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action sin1ply 
asks, ''That the contract above mentioned be declared 
null and void." (Paragraph 1 of Prayer, Page 11 of 
Plaintiff's Complaint.) 
In Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action, he does not 
claim that Zions Securities was in any way tied into or 
affected by the contract with Salt Lake City. 
Rule 12 (b) (6) U.R.C.P. was designed particularly 
to cover matters of this kind. The motion of Zions Se-
curities to dismiss upon the grounds that no claim is 
stated against this Defendant is well taken. This motion 
to dismiss performs substantially the same function as 
the old common law rule on demurrer. (See Moore's Fed. 
Prac., \ 7 ol. 2, p. 2244). See also ~11 Anz. J1tr .. , ··PLEAIJ.-
ING," Sec. 212, p. 442, ";herein it states: 
17 
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"A pleading may be subject to a general de-
murrer either because its allegations disclose no 
cause of action or defense, or because of the want 
of definite allegations essential to a cause of 
action or defense. Thus, a pleading which states 
only legal conclusions instead of facts is de-
murrerable.'' 
The Utah case of Hunt v. llfonroe, 32 l ... tah 428, 435, 
91 Pac. 269 stated : 
"It is elementary that a complaint good in 
law must not only state a complete cause of action 
against the Defendant but it must also show a 
right of action in the plaintiff.'' 
The only issue raised by the Appellant in connection 
with this particular point is found in Point XI and 
Point XIV of Appellant's Brief, and the argument is 
identical on the two points, since Point XI"\T simply says 
that they adopt what is said under Point XI. In this 
particular instance, they argue that to allow the De-
fendant, ·Corporation of the President or Zions Securi-
ties to buy any property is to violate the Constitution 
of the state of Utah and in particular Section 4~ Article 
I of said Constitution which reads as follo,vs: 
". . . There shall be no union of church and 
state, nor shall any church don1inate the state or 
interfere with its functions." ... 
First, tl1ere has been no dealing 'vith the state of 
lJtah in the case before the Court. Second, even if it 
"'"ere asstuned that the contract "~as bet\Yeen the church 
and the state there has been no union of church and state. 
18 
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In the present case there is a contract for sale of 
land to the Corporation of the President and not Zions 
~PeLLrities. The purchase price or terms of the contract 
have not been attacked as being unconsionable or unfair 
to either party, nor do the actions of either party point 
to overreaching. In fact, both parties seem \vell aware 
of "·hat is happening, and appear to agree that the sale 
of land will be beneficial to the community. 
Any interpretation of this section of the Utah Con-
stitution to prevent the sale of public land to religious 
institutions would be beyond the 1neaning of the clause, 
and it would hinder the activity of both the state and 
religious groups in their dealing one with the other. The 
reason for the provision in the Constitution is to prevent 
religions from applyng pressure because of their size 
and influence on the state government. In the present 
case \\'"here the Church is acting in the same capacity 
as a private person there is no reason to invoke this 
provision. In the beginning of our country and our state 
'vhen all land was the property of the state the inter-
pretation urged by the Plaintiff would mean that the 
govern1nent and church could not contract for the sale 
of the land, and that all religious groups would have to 
\\·ait to purchase land from private individuals - such 
interpretation was never intended nor such action con-
templated. 
It is to shape the word "union'' beyond reason to 
say it means "there shall be no vendor-vendee relation 
het,veen church and state.'' 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(b) IN THE FIRST CAUSE OF A·CTION AS A MATTER 
OF LAW NEITHER 'THE PLAINTIFF NOR FAUSETT HAS 
ANY CLAIM TO ANY TRUST FUND, NOR IS THERE ANY 
BREA·CH OF TRUST. 
Substantially the only difference betw .. een the Com-
plaint of the Plaintiff and the Complaint in Intervention 
of the Fausetts is that it is alleged that the Fausetts 
are no\v, and at all times herein alleged, have been mem-
bers of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
and that they have made contributions in tithing and 
otherwise to said chureh; that by reason of said contri-
bution being so made and being n1embers of the Church, 
they have a vested interest in the trust fund 1nentioned 
in the co1nplaint filed. It is admitted that the Plaintiff 
Stone is not a member of the church. 
Since Zions Securities is a corporation organized 
for pecuniary profit it can do nearly anything a natural 
person can do. Only a stockholder could complain. X ot-
\vithstanding, we present the follo\Ying cases "'"hich dis-
cuss the matter of the trustee's relationship occupied by 
a religious organization in respect to its 1nembers. 
In ltf c~T rilly v. First Presbyterian Ch urrlz. ~-l-3 :Jiass. 
331, 137 N.E. 691 the court held: 
'~It follo,vs that the gifts to the corporation 
1n the case at bar " ... herehy its \Yas enabled to 
arquire land, a 1neeting house and n1anse, \Yere 
gifts to a valid public charity. l\ one of these gifts 
\vere 1nade upon an~ ... express trust. They simply 
\vere handed over to the corporation "'"ith only 
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'"The faets as to the collection of 1noney, the 
establi~lnnent of the church and the organization 
of the corporation are indistinguishable in their 
legal aspeet~ from those appearing in litigation 
concerning the religious society before this court 
in ''r arner v. Bowdoin Square Baptist Society, 
1-!S ~lass. 400, 19 N.E. 403. It there was said by 
~lr. Justice Holmes at page 404 of 148 Mass. at 
page 403 of 19 K.E.: 
~~ 'It is too well settled to admit of argument 
that the foregoing facts do not make the legal 
corporation a trustee for the church.' 
"1\1 o such trust is shown in the case at bar 
because the gifts were all to the corporation with-
out e~rpress trust or condition of any kind. These 
gifts being thus free from express trust or limi-
tation, must be held to have been intended for 
the lp,romotion,!,. of the purposes for ~hich the 
corporation was instituted and subject to all the 
conditions thereby imported by the nature of the 
donee. The corporation is a creature of the la'\v. 
It possesses those powers, is subject to the obli-
gations and enjoys the immunities and privileges 
conferred upon it by the law of the land. A re-
ligious society, when it becomes a corporation, 
rests tttpon the foundation established for it by 
the law. The corporation defendant in the case at 
bar was organized as a religious society under 
the general laws of this commonwealth. 
"'The sirnple declaration implied from the 
name and from the adoption of the hy-la\vs by 
the corporation that the policy of a particular 
denomination as to the selection of ministers 
would be followed, cannot be regarded as an 
abandonment of its constitutional powers. It does 
not convert free gifts into gifts upon an implied 
trust that such policy shall be observed. These 
gifts were to the corporation upon the charity 
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that they should be employed in general for the 
worship of God. There is no contention that the 
general charity for which the corporation was 
organized has been perverted in any other par-
ticular than in the selection of the minister. 
"The present majority of the corporation 
constitute its dominating power by regular suc-
cession and in due order. There is no such trust 
imposed on the property as requ~res inquiYry into 
the conform·ity of present members, or the regu-
larity of the corporate action brought about by 
them, to the views of r~tinisterial call entertained 
by the great body of Presbyter~ans or established 
by the ecclesiastical policy of that denomination. 
See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall." (Emphasis added) 
Although there is no trust relationship bet\veen 
Zions Securities and Plaintiff or Fausett, it may be 
helpful to the Court to review the following authorities 
as to the standing of a donor to a fund devoted to charity 
in a court of equity as to its disposition and control: 
See 14 C.J.S. ''Charities," p. 526 "'"herein it states: 
'· .. A .. s a general rule, the contributors to a fund 
creating a trust for mere charitable purposes can-
not call the trustee of that fund to an account 
for a misapplication of the fund or any other 
breach of the trust. There 1nust be something 
peculiar in the transaction, beyond the mere fact 
of contribution, to give a contributor to a chari-
table fund a foothold in court to enable him to 
question the disposition of the fund." (See also 
10 Am. Jur., "Charities,'' Sec. 116, page 670 to 
the sa1ne effect.) 
The ease of .. ·l n1undson v. /(let.zing - J/ cLanghlin 
Men1. Found. College. 2--+7 lo\YU 91, 73 N.\,T. 2d~ 11-±, 
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'vas a ease \\'here the heirs sought to rornpell an account-
ing of a fund and clairned it was being 1nisapplied. The 
trial court dismissed their complaint and the state Su-
preme Court affirmed. lieadnote K o. 7 clearly states 
the holding as follows: 
HWhere the donor has effectually passed out 
of himself all interest in the fund devoted to a 
charity, neither he nor those claiming under him 
have any standing in a court of equity as to its 
disposition and control." 
In the Amundson Case, supra, the court further 
stated at Page 117: 
H Plaintiffs' only interest in the college is a 
sentimental one which was not sufficient basis 
for enlisting aid of the court, however laudable 
their purpose may be in seeking such aid. No 
financial or other advantage which the law rec-
ognizes will accrue to plaintiffs from execution 
of the trust. Nor have they suffered any financial 
loss from the matters of which they complaim. 
The mere fact that as members of the public they 
1nay benefit from the enforcement of the trust 
does not ent~tle them to sue." (Emphasis added) 
In Society of California Pioneers, et al, v. Ill cElroy, 
et al, 63 C.A. 2d 332, 1 ±6 P. ( 2d) 962, 967, the court states 
as follows: 
"The law is well settled that when property 
has become fully vested in trustees for a valid 
charitable purpose, neither the creater of the 
trust nor his heirs or assigns have any standing 
in court in a proceeding to compel the proper 
execution of the trust, except as relators." 
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Where the testor donated to a home for wayward 
girls in the City of Portland, an attempt was made there-
after by his heirs to control disposition of the fund, the 
court held: 
"Plaintiffs (the heirs) have no more interest 
in the property involved in the litigation than if 
they "\Yere absolute strangers to the blood of the 
benevolent testator. The generous fund provided 
for said home belongs to public charity and one 
not interested directly in the adn1inistration of 
that fund or the dul~T appointed officer of the 
state cannot maintain a legal proceeding for an 
accounting or the control of the administration 
of said fund.'' (Citing numerous cases) lV em me 
et al v. Naves et al, 134 Or. 590, 294 P. 602, 603 
(1930). 
Therefore, Plaintiff has no standing to interfere in 
any way "\vith the conduct and 1nanagement of said fund. 
See, also, Fa1:rbanks v. City of Appleton, 249 \Y.isc. 476, 
24 N. W. (2d) 893. 
The Restatement of Trusts, Section 391 (d) states: 
"d. Person having no special interest. .A._ suit 
for the enforce1nent of a charitable trust cannot 
be 1naintained by per~ons "\Yho haYe no special 
interest in the enforce1nent of the tru~t. The 
1nere fact that as n1e1nbers of the public they 
benefit from the enforce1nent of the trust is not 
a sufficient ground to entitle then1 to sue~ since 
a suit on their behalf can be 1naintained by the 
Attorney General." 
Even if \\Te assu1ne for the purpose of this argu1nent 
that there is a trust fund in "\vhich Plaintiff and Fausett 
have an interest and if \\T0 furthPr a~sun1e that they can 
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bring an aetion in connection \vith the adn1inistration 
of such trust fund, the court still properly disn1issed thu 
complaint because there has been no breach of the trust. 
Plaintiff's only allegation is that the ·'trust fund" is 
being u~ed for the purchase of a site for the proposed 
FPderal Building. Insofar as Zions Securities is con-
eerned, the corporate laws of the State of Utah (U.C.A. 
1953, 16-2-14:) give it the power to contract and the power 
to buy and sell real estate or even the power to make 
donations for the public welfare or for charitable, sci-
entific, religious or educational purposes. (See particu-
larly the 1955 amendment to 16-2-14.) 
The complaint of the Plaintiff and Fausett alleges: 
u7. That the purpose or object of defendant, 
Corporation of The President of the ·Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, as stated in 
its Articles of Incorporation is to acquire, hold, 
dispose of such real and personal property as 
may be conveyed to or acquired by said ·Corpora-
tion for the benefit of the members of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a religious 
society for the benefit of religion, for works of 
charity, and for public worship." (Emphasis 
added) (Pargraph 7, page 2, Plaintiff's Com-
plaint.) 
In the Articles of Incorporation of the Corporation 
of the President it states: 
HSecond: The object of this corporation shall 
be to acquire, hold and dispose of such real and 
personal property as many be conveyed to or 
acquired by said corporation for the benefit of 
the members of the Church of Jesus ·Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, a religious society, for the 
benefit of religion, for works of charity and for 
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public worship. Such real and personal property 
may be situated, wither 'vithin the State of Utah, 
or elsewhere, and this corporation shall have 
power, without any authority or authorization 
from the members of such Church or religious 
society, to grant, sell, convey, rent, mortgage, ex-
change, or otherwise dispose of any part or all 
of such property." (Emphasis added) 
Thus it is abundantly clear that both by the allega-
tions and by the laws of this state Zions Securities and 
the Corporation of the President can use their funds 
for "works of charity." The use of funds for gifts for 
governmental or municipal purposes is a use for "~rorks 
of charity.'' This is clearly stated in 10 An~. Jur., ~"Chari­
ties," Section 79, p. 641 as follows: 
"A Gift in trust for a legal purpose that will 
tend to reduce taxation and lessen the burdens 
of government is a charitable gift. Gifts to the 
government for its general benefit or for the re-
duction of the state or national debt are valid. 
In this connection, gifts for varied municipal 
purposes, whether general or specific in terms, 
are usually sustained as valid charitable gifts. 
The American Law Institute Restatement is in 
accord with these principles, as it states that a 
trust for government or municipal purposes is 
charitable, although the purpose is not to supply 
the community with any specified facilities. 
Therefore, a gift of land in trust for the use of 
the inhabitants of a to,,:n is a gift for a valid 
charitable purpose. 
"Likewise, it is .a ralid and enforceable char-
ity to give funds for the erection of a public 
building to be used for governn1ental purposes, 
for general municipal improvements, for the im-
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paving, cleaning, and lighting them, for the pro-
vision of a good and \vholesome water supply for 
the city or community, for municipal fire equip-
ment, or for the improvement of the municipal 
police force. For the same reasons, a gift of a 
fund to be applied in constructing a pesthouse 
constitutes a public charity, as do gifts for the 
laying out, improvement and repair of highways 
and bridges, or for the purchase of life boats. 
A gift for the establishment or support of a pub-
lic park also is a charitable gift. Similarly, a gift 
to preserve or develop the beauties of nature is 
a valid charity for the purpose which might have 
been undertaken by a governmental agency at the 
public expense." (Emphasis added) 
See also Restatement of Trusts (Second) Section 
373 ~hich states: 
"A trust for the erection or maintenance of 
public buildings, bridges, streets, highways, parks 
or other public works or for other governmental 
or municipal purposes is charitable." 
The mere fact that the gift or bequest may also work 
a benefit to the federal taxpayers does not change the 
charitable nature of the gift. (See Re Tarrant, 38 Cal. 
2d 42, 237 P. 2d 505, 28 A.L.R. 2d 419.) 
See also Scott on Trusts, Vol. 3, wherein he dis-
cusses charitable trusts and states the following on pages 
1998 and 1999 : 
"373. Governmental or municipal purposes. 
A trust for the erection or construction or main-
tenance of public works is charitable. In the Stat-
ute of Charitable Uses are included trusts 'for 
repair of bridges, ports, havens, cause\vayR, 
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churches, sea-banks and high\vays.' It has been 
held that a trust for the purpose of supplying 
the community with these or other facilities, \Yhich 
are usually supplied at the expense of taxpayers, 
is charitable. 11hus the co?Jrts lurue upheld trust.s 
for the erection of a town hall or sinlilar public 
building; for the construction or repair of high-
ways; for the erection or maintenance of bridges; 
for the establishment or maintenance of public 
parks; for the construction of water works; for 
protection against fire; and the like. A trust may 
be charitable, not only because it is for a govern-
mental or municipal purpose, but because it is 
also for the relief of poverty, or for the advance-
ment of education, or for the pro1notion of health. 
Thus a trust to maintain a public almshouse, or 
a public school, or a municipal hospital, is clearly 
charitable. 
"373.1. General Trusts for public purposes. 
A trust for the benefit of the nation, or a state 
of municipality is charitable, although the par-
ticular method of applying the property i.s not 
provided for. Thus trusts for the following pur-
poses have been upheld; for the benefit of a 
town; for purposes conducing to the good of a 
certain county and parish; for public \vorks of 
a city; for the benefit of the nation; for general 
town expenses: for the benefit and orna1nent of 
a to\vn; for the improvement of a city.'' (Em-
phasis added) 
It is iu1possible to see ho\\T the action of the Defend-
ant Zions Securitie~ or the Corporation of the Pre~ident 
could be dPPined anything but charitable in light of the 
prevailing A1nerican authority on the subject. X or is 
there any validity in the arglunent that the h\Yorks of 
charity'' be ~on fined to the 1nembers of the Church. The 
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cia uses contained in the second article of the .1\.rticles of 
ln<'orporation l)ach stand alone as purposes of the Cor-
poration of the President. It is only a stilted interpre-
tation that would make ''works of charity" apply only 
to the Mormon Church. That the interpretation of "works 
of eharity'' must apply to all people is borne out by the 
hi~tory of the Mormon Church since the Church from its 
beginning as given to such charities as the Boy Scouts 
of America and the lJnited Fund. But even if the court 
should adopt the interpretation that .. ,,~orks of charity~' 
must apply to the benefit of the Inembers of the Thiormon 
Church, it would not make the act done by the Corpor-
ation of the President a breach of trust since this court 
held in Staines v. Burton, 17 lTtah 331, 53 Pac. 1015, 
that a trust for ""schools, parks, water works, planting 
forests, accli1natizing plants" \vas a charitable trust and 
that it was for the benefit of the members of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
Therefore, taking the interpretation most favorable 
to the Plaintiff or Fausett there has been no breach of 
trust, since the act was a ''charitable work" and it bene-
fited the members of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints. 
CONCLUSION 
This Defendant Zions Securities, respectfully sub-
mits that: 
(1) Neither Plaintiff nor Fausett have any stand-
ing in court to sue this Defendant; 
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(2) The Second ·Cause of Action fails to state any 
claim against this Defendant; 
( 3) There is no trust fund that either Plaintiff nor 
Fausett can have any legal interest in; and 
( 4) There has been no breach of any "trust'' be-
cause lawfully this Defendant and the Corporation of 
the President can lawfully use their funds for "'vorks 
of charity" and the use of funds for a site for a Federal 
Building is a "work of charity" within the law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Dean E. Conder 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
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